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Abstract
I here present some doubts about whether Mandik’s (2010) proposed intermediacy and recurrence
constraints are necessary and sufficient for agentive experience. I also argue that in order to vindicate
the conclusion that agentive experience is an exclusively perceptual phenomenon (Prinz, 2007), it is
not enough to show that the predictions produced by forward models of planned motor actions are
conveyed by mock sensory signals. Rather, it must also be shown that the outputs of ‘‘comparator’’
mechanisms that compare these predictions against actual sensory feedback are also coded in a
perceptual representational format.
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Following Bayne and Pacherie (2007), I shall refer to conscious awareness of being the
causal author of an action as agentive experience.1 According to a currently influential
‘‘comparator-based’’ model of agentive experience (Bayne & Pacherie, 2007; Frith,
Blakemore, & Wolpert, 2000; Grush, 2007), the motor control system exploits forward
models of planned actions (also known as ‘‘emulators’’) in order to predict the sensory
consequences of bodily movement, for example, the kinaesthetic, tactile, and ⁄or visual feed-
back that would result as consequences of reaching for a cup of coffee. When comparator
mechanisms detect a sufficiently robust match between predicted and actual sensory reaffer-
ences, a registration of agency is generated and the subject may experience her movements
as self-generated. If, however, a mismatch is detected, then the subject may experience her
movements or aspects thereof as having an external or ‘‘alien’’ cause.
Pete Mandik’s (2010) proposed Allocentric-Egocentric Interface theory of control con-
sciousness (AEICC), like the comparator-based model, focuses on low-level, domain-specific
mechanisms of action production and monitoring, as opposed to holistic, domain-general,
mechanisms involved in ‘‘narrative’’ self-understanding (Stephens & Graham, 2000;
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Wegner, 2002). AEICC, departs from the comparator-based model, however, in requiring that
conscious control states meet two further constraints. First, they must exhibit intermediacy,
both in the sense that they must be formed at a neuroanatomically intermediate-level in the
motor processing hierarchy—identified by Mandik with premotor cortex in the frontal
lobe—and in the sense that they must have intermediate-level, egocentric spatial contents.
Second, they must be ‘‘constituted by pairs of recurrently interacting allocentric and egocen-
tric [motor] representations’’ in a pseudo-closed-loop, that is, forward-model-involving, con-
trol architecture.
As this contribution is short, I will uncharitably focus on outlining some difficulties for
the elegant AEICC approach.
First, it is not clear that motor representations with abstract, allocentric contents are
necessary for agentive experience in the manner suggested by the recurrence constraint.
Arguably, agentive experiences may obtain as a consequence of acting so as to fulfill
present-directed or ‘‘proximal’’ intentions that have fully egocentric spatial contents, for
example, the intention to point or turn toward a sudden flash of light at a certain location
in (distal) body-relative space.2 The transformation of such a present-directed intention
into an appropriate set of motor intentions, plausibly involves not the transformation of
allocentric motor representations into egocentric motor representations, but rather the
transformation of extrinsic, directional motor parameters into intrinsic, kinematic motor
parameters.
Second, the restriction of conscious control states to intermediate-level motor representa-
tions seems unmotivated. Indeed, many prominent theorists identify high-level, prior inten-
tions such as Grab a coffee mug or Go to the market as conscious motor representations
(Frith et al., 2000; Jacob & Jeannerod 2003; Jeannerod, 2007).
Third, neuropsychological findings do not point to premotor cortex as the neural locus of
agentive experience. While there is evidence that rostral premotor areas do play an ‘‘inter-
mediary’’ liaison role between executive, prefrontal areas and motor areas that project
directly to spinal cord (for a review, see Graziano, 2008, chap. 4), there is also a large body
of clinical and neuroimaging evidence that the cerebellum is involved in constructing
forward models of bodily actions (Wolpert & Kawato, 1998) and that parietal cortex, also
omitted by Mandik’s scheme, plays a major in the comparator matching process (Blakemore
& Sirigu, 2003; Frith et al., 2000; Jeannerod, 2007). If the question is where the sense of
agency arises in the motor control system, then the currently available evidence suggests
that we need to look beyond intermediary areas in the frontal lobe.
Last, the ‘‘raw,’’ initial output of hypothesized comparator mechanisms, when predicted
and actual reafferences match, is not itself a conscious agentive experience, but rather a
nonconscious registration of agency (Synofzik, Vosgerau, & Newen, 2008).3 Whether a
nonconscious registration of agency gives rises to a conscious agentive experience depends
on a variety of factors, including temporal dynamics (rapidly performed actions may be
completed before consciousness can ‘‘catch up’’ with them) and, importantly, allocation of
attention. Notably, this is the case even when the agent is acting so as to fulfill a future-
directed, prior intention. For example, I may form the intention to walk to the store and then
go on to perform some of the subsidiary actions necessary to fulfill that intention on ‘‘auto-
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pilot’’ if my attention is elsewhere focused. The important point is that in such autopilot
cases comparator mechanisms are involved in the formation, implementation, and monitor-
ing of motor intentions, but the subpersonal registrations of agency that they produce do not
rise to the level of conscious awareness. This suggests that intermediacy and recurrence are
not jointly sufficient for agentive experience and that certain further attentional constraints
must be met.
I turn now to the question of whether conscious agentive experience is an exclusively
perceptual phenomenon. According to Jesse Prinz (2007), the answer is yes. Like other
proponents of the comparator approach, Prinz assumes that the prediction produced by the
forward model is a sensory signal: It functions as an ‘‘anticipatory somatosensory image’’
or, as Rick Grush (2007) puts its, ‘‘mock sensory information.’’ Although Mandik centrally
disputes this assumption, he agrees with Prinz that it entails ‘‘an account of control con-
sciousness wherein control consciousness turns out to be a form of sensory consciousness
after all.’’
As I see it, however, the assumption that forward models generate mock sensory infor-
mation does not by itself entail the conclusion that agentive experience is exclusively per-
ceptual in nature. Rather, in order to motivate this conclusion, it would also have to be
shown that the registrations of agency produced by comparator mechanisms, when con-
scious, make a sensory contribution to the phenomenology of acting. That is, even if the
comparator matching process does involve the comparison of mock sensory information
with incoming sensory feedback, the output of the matching process need not, in turn, be a
signal coded in a perceptual representational format. In general, mechanisms that receive
sensory signals as inputs need not produce sensory signals as outputs. Sensorimotor trans-
formation—the mapping of perceptual inputs onto motoric outputs—is a clear case in
point.
The question, then, is not whether comparator inputs are exclusively sensory, but rather
whether comparator outputs are exclusively sensory. Do the registrations of agency pro-
duced by the putative comparator matching process make an exclusively sensory contribu-
tion to the phenomenology of intentional acting?
There are a number of different possibilities. Here are but two. First, the output produced
by comparator mechanisms, when consciously accessible, could take the form of a sui
generis, nonperceptual ‘‘feeling of agency.’’ Mandik suggests that the relevant output chan-
nel might have a very low bandwidth, making the signal it conveys hard to discriminate
against a high-bandwidth sensory background. Moreover, the act of introspection itself
might blur the image in the Humean microscope, ‘‘given that introspection itself puts a
load on control processes.’’ Phenomenological disputes are indeed notoriously difficult to
adjudicate, but without proposed experimental measures the nonperceptual signal hypo-
thesis does not seem to be adequately motivated.4
A second possibility, consistent rather with Prinz’s position, is that when predicted and
actual reafferences match, the comparator’s primary contribution to conscious awareness is a
negative one: It attenuates or cancels out actual reafferences so as to accentuate the salience
of externally caused sensory inputs (Blakemore & Frith, 2003).5 On this view—presented
here in extremely abbreviated form—there is no distinct, sui generis experience of acting.
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Rather, as Elisabeth Pacherie (2001, p. 174) suggests, ‘‘our ordinary experience of agency
may simply be a rather diffuse sense of a coherent ongoing flow of anticipations and sensory
feedback.’’ This possibility is also consistent with the influential model of passivity phenom-
ena in schizophrenia proposed by Frith et al. (2000) (Fig. 1). Missing from the schizo-
phrenic’s experience, on this model, is not a ‘‘distinctively nonsensory component,’’ but
rather conscious awareness of the predicted sensory consequences of action. The schizo-
phrenic has the intention to grasp a cup; she is able successfully to plan and control the req-
uisite movements; and she is moreover aware that the movements she actually makes
match her intention; but she lacks awareness of the prediction produced by the forward
model and, thus, lacks awareness of initiating her grasping action. Prinz’s account is con-
sistent with this model because it assumes that actions that are not preceded by anticipatory
somatosensory images will not be experienced as self-generated. By contrast, it is not
evident that AEICC has the resources to explain what is amiss here because the
schizophrenic’s deficit does not seem to reside either in the absence of intermediate-level
motor representations or in the absence of recurrent processing—in particular, in the
absence of a pseudo-closed-loop control architecture.6
In conclusion, AEICC is a compact and elegant theory of agentive experience, but more
work needs to be done in order, first, to clarify and justify its intermediacy and recurrence
constraints and, second, to show that there is a distinctively nonsensory, but nonetheless
introspectible component in control consciousness.7
Fig. 1. The underlying disorder in schizophrenic delusions of control. The patient is aware that her movement
(actual state) matches her intention (desired state) but lacks awareness of the change in state predicted by the for-
ward model. The patient feels as though her intentions are being monitored and her actions controlled by some
external force. Adapted from Frith et al. (2000) with permission of the Royal Society.
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Notes
1. There are good reasons to suppose that this experience has a number of distinguishable
components. For fine-grained examination, see Pacherie, 2008.
2. See Gallagher, in press for relevant discussion.
3. To use the language of Grush, 2007, this registration only amounts to an ‘‘implicit
representation’’ of agency.
4. Which is not to say that the hypothesis is merely conjectural: Mandik argues that
positing nonperceptual control signals accounts for our ability to distinguish internally
generated sensory images from sensory perceptions with similar contents. For alterna-
tive explanations of this ability that are compatible with Prinz’s sensory account of
agentive experience, however, see the contribution by Mylopoulos in this issue.
5. This may not be its only contribution, however. There is evidence that self-generated
actions and their sensory effects exhibit ‘‘intentional binding,’’ that is, are perceived
as being closer together in time than are non-self-generated actions and their sensory
effects (Haggard, Clark, & Kalogeras, 2002).
6. Frith et al. write: ‘‘There is nothing obviously abnormal in the motor control of these
patients. This suggests that accurate representations of predicted states are available
and used by the motor system. However, these representations are not available to
awareness’’ (p. 1784).
7. I am grateful to Rick Cooper, Lisa Mosier, and an anonymous referee for helpful com-
ments on this paper.
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